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JUDICIALIZATION OF THE ARBITRAL PROCESS
BRUNO ZELLER*
ABSTRACT
This paper will critically investigate the issue of judicialization of 
arbitration.  Specific issue, such as length complexity and cost of 
proceeding, will be analysed. It will conclude that a balancing of party 
autonomy and fairness will assist in resolving the criticism. In effect, a 
move towards a best practice framework will minimise the trend. The 
issues of the seat as well as the incidence of setting aside and enforcing 
arbitral awards are specifically discussed with the view of finding judicial 
“creep”. 
I  INTRODUCTION
Commercial arbitration has undoubtedly progressed to a point where the question 
needs to be asked: what next? The point of progression is arguably the strengthening of 
arbitral rules to keep up with changes in economic activities. One example is the change 
in the ‘Hong Kong Rules’ to be able to enforce foreign judgment in China.1 
There is always a tension between national laws and arbitration considering that 
national laws attempt to preserve what might be termed “sacred cows”.  National laws 
indeed have and must establish new “and perhaps abbreviated domestic priorities for 
the 21st century.”2 The new “talking point” evolves around the issue of judicialization 
of the arbitral process. It is interesting to note that Carbonneau borrowed the words of 
David Stewart, who noted regarding this issue as: “manifest destiny, manifest disregard, 
or manifest error.”3 
What is uncontested is that arbitration has always been attractive due to its commercial 
expedience and, importantly, its functional pragmatism.4 The point is that arbitration has 
offered a process which - not completely removed from the judicial system – was still 
faster, less costly and produced results that were “innovative.” However, as  Carbonneau 
has noted, “arbitration has passed from the state of nature to life in civilized society and, 
in the process, has acquired many of the trappings of the dysfunctional judicial trial.”5 
This has been pointed out by a survey conducted by Queen Mary University of London 
in 2013, which pointed to “‘judicialization of arbitration’ as the single greatest concern 
1 * Dr. Bruno Zeller is a Professor of Transnational Law in the Law School at the University of Western 
Australia, Perth, Adjunct Professor, School of Law, Murdoch University – Perth, Fellow of the Australian 
Institute for Commercial Arbitration, Panel of Arbitrators – MLAANZ, Visiting Professor Stetson Law 
School, Florida, Humboldt University Berlin and Aalborg University Denmark. 
 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), SECTION V.  AWARDS, DECISIONS AND ORDERS 
OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, (Web Page, 2018) < https://www.hkiac.org/arbitration/rules-practice-notes/
administered-arbitration-rules/hkiac-administered-2018-2>.
2  Thomas Carbonneau,  ‘Carbonneau on International Arbitration: Collected Essays’ (2011) Juris Net  125.
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid [126].
5  Ibid at [127].
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in the future of commercial arbitration and one of its most damaging obstacles. “6 
Stipanovich also urged arbitrators to not follow lawyer-made “monolithic” procedures.7 
In addition, Justice Moreno from the California Supreme Court noted that: “arbitration is 
intended to be an efficient, fair, and inexpensive avenue for resolving complex disputes 
but I’ve seen a trend lately where it is becoming ‘judicialized’, with the courts getting 
more and more involved.” 8 In essence, it has been argued that arbitration is only a step 
parties must undertake before litigation.9 Recently, several arbitrators have conducted 
interviews and sent out questionnaires investigating whether legalism or judicialization 
is infecting arbitration.10 
Arguably, this criticism is directed where arbitration and the judicial system – 
due to national laws – must meet. The point is that arbitrators cannot acquire judicial 
functions as this is the reserve of national laws and the legal process itself. The courts 
will always exercise an oversight over the arbitral process and specifically in the area of 
setting side or enforcing awards the national law of a state will direct the process. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in Articles 34 and 
36 and the New York Convention in Article V have regulated this issue. However, the 
point is that only nations where the two instruments have been adopted will potentially 
exhibit a harmonisation. It follows that the choice of the seat is important in order to 
at least have a harmonised and hence relatively predictable approach in the process of 
judicial oversight. 
Arguably, the problem of judicialization can be grouped into an ‘internal’ problem 
and into an ‘external’ problem. The internal problem, in effect, is driven by arbitrators 
that are primarily retired judges who bring their experience of the running of a trial into 
the management of the arbitration. Unfortunately, this simply creates extra cost and is 
not timely because the arbitration is more akin to a trial. Phillips also remarked:
“One arbitrator attributed the problem to lack of arbitrator training, citing 
many
retired judges who have become arbitrators who simply do in arbitration 
what they did in court. However, many respondents said that lawyers too “fall 
back on methods they know” and “have difficulty getting out of the litigation 
paradigm.”11
Horvath further notes that failure to abandon judicialization of arbitration may 
6  Bruno Zeller and  Camilla Andersen, ‘Discerning the Seat of Arbitration – An Example of Judicialisation of 
Arbitration, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial law and Arbitration’(2015) 192, 195.
7  Thomas Stipanowich, ‘Arbitration: The “New Litigation”’ (2010) University of Illinois Law Review, 1, 
1-60.
8  LEGAL NEWSLINE, Justice Moreno: Arbitration Becoming ‘Judicialized’, (Web Page, 18 February 2010) 
<http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510522428-justice-moreno-arbitration-becoming-judicialized#sthash.
OaAe34AH.dpuf>.
9  Leon Trakman and Hugh Montgomery, ‘The ‘Judicialization’ of International Commercial Arbitration: 
Pitfall or Virtue?’ (2017) Leiden Journal of International Law, 30.2, 406.
10  Remy Gerbay, ‘Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of International 
Arbitration’(2014), The American Review of International Arbitration, 25.2, 223; Gerald Phillips, ‘Is 
Creeping Legalism Infection Arbitration?’ Dispute Resolution Journal 9, 37. 
11 Ibid [39-40].
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jeopardise justice in international business disputes.12  This issue has been somewhat 
solved by institutional organisation in creating expediated processes. In the end, it is up 
to the parties to be aware of this issue and choose arbitrators that are to their liking. This 
issue will not be further pursued in this paper. 
The effect of the seat and the enforcement has contributed to the judicialization of 
the arbitral process. Undoubtedly, issues that are not within the competence of arbitrators 
must inevitably end in court. However, an understanding of the relevant processes is of 
paramount importance and, in the end, parties to an arbitral dispute must be aware of the 
issues in order to minimise judicialization of the process.  After all the parties have the 
ability to choose arbitrators, they can control the “internal” process. Simply put, “the 
crux … is that there are other, equally important, aspects of [International Commercial 
Arbitration] beyond allegations of ‘judicialization’ that need to be improved so as to 
promote this method of alternative dispute resolution.”13
II  IS THERE JUDICIALIZATION?
Undoubtedly, there are elements of judicialization within arbitration. As noted 
above, arbitrators themselves have contributed to it by prolonged formalistic procedures 
of judicialization within arbitration. Additionally, large companies engage senior lawyers 
to prepare for hearings and they are using the same tactics used in litigation and, hence, 
prepare lengthy briefs while searching for legal intricacies in making or responding to 
claims.  Flannery suggests that 85% of costs are party costs due to hiring lawyers and 
experts.14 It is unsurprising that Gerbay’s study reveals that arbitration has not suddenly 
become judicialized but, instead, only perceptions of the process draw this picture.15 The 
driving factor is the observation that costs and the duration of arbitrations have made 
arbitration less attractive. However, the issue as Gerbay noted is that little research has 
been conducted and empirical data is scarce.16 Thus, the issue of judicialization rests 
on anecdotal evidence. It rests mainly on the argument as advanced by Fali Nariman, 
who noted: “[international commercial arbitration] has become indistinguishable from 
litigation, which it was at one time intended to supplant.”17 Even if that was true, it can 
also be argued that arbitration has become more sophisticated and, accordingly, more 
procedurally formalized. The fact that most institutional rules are constantly updated to 
take note of developments in the field speaks for itself. 
As arbitration is getting “older” it can also become more sophisticated; hence, a 
certain similarity between litigation and arbitration is inevitable. In most cases, there 
is only one “best practice” formula to deal with procedures. The fact that there are still 
12  Günther Horvath ‘The Judicialization of International Arbitration : does the Increasing Introduction of 
Litigation-Style Practices, Regulations, Norms and Structures into International Arbitration Risk a Denial of 
Justice in International Business Disputes?’ (2011) International Arbitration and International Commercial 
Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution 251, 271.
13  Trakman (n 9) 406.
14  Louis Flannery and Benjamin Garel, ‘Arbitration Costs Compared: The Sequel’, (2013) Global Arbitration 
Review 8.1, 4.
15  R. Gerbay, ‘Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of International 
Arbitration’ (2014) 25(2) The American Review of International Arbitration 223, 226-7.
16  Ibid.
17  Fali Nariman, ‘The Spirit of Arbitration-The Tenth Annual Goff Lecture’ (2011) Arbitration International 
16, 262.
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significant differences between arbitration and litigation, such as confidentiality, indicates 
that the two systems are not identical. It follows that the issue of cost and increased time 
is not to be confused with judicialization. Cost and delays are a consequence of complex 
commercial issues. This is confirmed by Gerbay and others. They have found that there 
is no evidence to support that international arbitration has become more judicialized but 
that commercial disputes are increasingly larger and more complex. Thus, such disputes 
are procedurally complicated, which increases costs and time.18  A good example is the 
recent Yukos dispute dealing with an award of 38 billion Euros.19 Simply put, it was 
a claim of indirect expropriation that was brought by three shareholders against the 
Russian Federation. It follows that courts are increasingly asked to assist in matters that 
are beyond the scope of the agreement or not within the competence of the arbitrators. 
It must always be remembered that, whether we deal in litigation or arbitration, an 
adjudicator cannot gloss over material facts, wrongly apply the relevant law, or exclude 
expert witnesses. This is exactly the reason why the model law and the New York 
Convention allow a review if justice has not been served. It is simply not possible to 
exclude courts from the arbitral process. This is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 
Model Law and the New York Convention have recognised this issue long time ago. 
Arguably, courts intervene in relation to the seat and enforcement; setting aside awards 
has long been recognised and enshrined in the relevant rules.  What can be said is that 
there is select judicialization within arbitration; however, whether it is detrimental to 
the progress and continued success of arbitration is yet to be seen. Gerbay offers a good 
definition, namely:
the term ‘judicialization’ is used to refer to the phenomenon by which 
international arbitration procedure increasingly resembles domestic litigation, as 
a result of an increase in procedural formality/sophistication and litigiousness.20
Each of these reasons, namely increased formality and litigiousness, need to be 
examined. Gerbay, in his sample study, isolated the issue of challenges to arbitrators. 
The unsuccessful challenges and inter-party agreement on the number of arbitrators 
reflected the litigiousness of the arbitral process.21 His conclusion was that “the empirical 
evidence examined does not offer clear proof, as it might have been expected, of an 
increase in the litigiousness of international arbitration proceedings.”22
The issue of increasing formality and sophistication is more difficult to determine. 
“[T]he “inflation” of the procedural rules published by arbitral institutions, in the sense 
of an incremental expansion of institutional rules in both length and detail”23, is often 
taken as an indicator of judicialization. Just because rules are expanded does not in itself 
constitute a good indicator. A better view is that “judicialization depends on the actual 
substance of such rules.”24 Again, the evidence is not convincing. Some rules, such as 
Article 22(1) of the ICC Rules (2012), which states: “the arbitral tribunal and the parties 
shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective 
manner, having regard to the complexity and value of the dispute”, fosters simplicity. 
18  Trakman (n 9) 408.
19  Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation (2005) PCA 4.
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Additionally, there is a drop in the awarding of partial awards that also speaks against 
procedural formalism and judicial heaviness. Yet, the only indicator “that does support 
the idea that arbitration has become judicialized is the frequency of three-member 
tribunals as opposed to sole arbitrators.25 
The debate in relation to judicialization arguably looks at “the way we did business” 
ten or twenty years ago and proceeds to compare it with today’s global trade. Indeed, 
disputes that are more complicated involve more money and are the result of disputes 
between international corporations that have grown in complexity and size. The world - 
as the saying goes - does not stand still for anybody; this includes arbitration. It is only 
natural that arbitrations are more sophisticated and more complex. Gerbay observed 
that:
“In this respect, comparing the statistical information about the types 
of cases referred to ICC arbitrations 20 years ago and today is fascinating. It 
illustrates how globalization has reshaped the arbitration industry. The categories 
of disputes that featured prominently in the early 1990s have become much less 
important than some of the new categories (which often did not feature in the 
early statistical reports). … trading disputes represent a fraction of the ICC’s 
arbitrations. In 2012, the proportion of trading disputes had fallen to a mere 6% of 
the ICC’s caseload. In the same period, M&A disputes have become significantly 
more frequent at the ICC”.26
The conclusion that can be drawn is that arbitration has become more sophisticated 
and complex. Arguably, therefore, the question of judicialization needs to be 
distinguished from the effects of the maturing of a system that is keeping pace with the 
issues of globalisation. 
Put simply, what matters is not that arbitration proceedings be quick and simple, 
but that they be appropriate considering the particular needs of the case-- needs which 
may include, as the case may be, sophistication and lentor.27 It appears that a degree 
of cross purpose has entered the debate. If the ability to resolve complex and difficult 
disputes, which do take longer than just a quick fix, is an expression of judicialization 
then arbitration has seen a degree of judicialization. However, the better view is that 
arbitration has risen to the challenge of twenty-first century disputes where major 
international corporations expect arbitral solutions. This is because the benefit of finality 
and the limited reasons to either set aside an award or refuse recognition is an important 
feature. It is interesting that a survey of arbitrators suggested that “the cure is in [the 
arbitrators] hands, and that they must control and better manage the process” and “that 
the arbitrator set a business-like tone in the beginning. “Counsel then will readily fall 
in line.”28
The problem, as highlighted above, is that imbedded under the current heading 
of ‘judicialization’ is a rhetorical simplification of the state of arbitration today. If 
any judicialization has taken place – which is debatable - it would be in areas where 





28  Phillips (n 10) [40].
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A  The Seat of Arbitration – an Example of Judicialization of Arbitration?
As noted above, arbitration cannot function properly in a legal vacuum. Kerr LJ in 
Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA already noted in 1985:
Despite suggestions to the contrary by some learned writers under other 
systems, our jurisprudence does not recognise the concept of arbitral procedures 
floating in the transnational firmament, unconnected with any municipal system 
of law.29
This is true whether we operate in litigation or arbitration, but the difference is that 
the plaintiff has the option to choose a legal system if there is a connecting factor under 
ligation. In effect, he can choose several, as long as there is a connecting factor. This is 
not the case in arbitration. The only determinate factor to a seat is a contractual clause 
in the contract to that effect or, at least, the nomination of an institutional rule.   If there 
is no choice in this regard, current case law suggests that a court will determine a seat 
taking account of all the surrounding circumstances. The key question here is: is that 
necessary? 
A valid argument can be made. First, there is no legal block to nominate and appoint 
arbitrators even if no seat has been nominated. Accordingly, arbitrators “need to have 
the confidence to make sound business judgements about issues like an applicable law 
and how their decisions are guided which do not need to conform to rigid procedural 
rules.”30 Institutional rules have already made this change, hence recourse to a court is 
not necessary. As an example, the Singapore Arbitration Rules (2016) note in Article 21: 
The parties may agree on the seat of the arbitration. Failing such an 
agreement, the seat of the arbitration shall be determined by the Tribunal, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case.31
 However, not all arbitrations rely on procedural rules that allow the arbitrators to 
nominate the seat. Therefore, recourse to courts will still be an unfortunate feature where 
no judicial inference is realistically necessary. The New York Convention supports this 
view because there is nothing in the Convention requiring the seat to be found, nor is the 
lack of it any obstacle to enforcement that can take place anywhere. It is also not bound 
to a seat. The problem is that:
Arbitrators fear non-enforcement, and Courts fear non-transparent 
regulations. So – at the danger of oversimplifying a complex process: if Courts 
embrace that enforcement of commercial arbitral awards arbitration enforcement 
is not pre-requisite on formalities and procedures and transparency of regulation, 
but embraces the promise of flexible commercial justice (as they ideally should) 
then arbitrators can let go of their fear of non-enforcement and everyone can 
focus on the outcome of the dispute. 32
Once the issue moves to setting aside or enforcing the award court, interference 
29  [1984] QB 291.
30  Bruno Zeller and Camilla Andersen (n 6) 210.
31  SIAC: Singapore International Arbitration Centre, SIAC Rules 2016, (Web Page, 1 August 2016) <http://
www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016#siac_rule21>.
32  Bruno Zeller and Camilla Andersen (n 6) at 212.
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is necessary because arbitrators are not judicial officers. Therefore, the question of 
judicialization of the process at the enforcement stage needs to be investigated.
B  Setting Aside and the Enforcement Process
In these circumstances, the argument changes as “ courts enforcing arbitral decisions 
need not insist on the transparency of regulations and procedure found in litigation.”33 
The enforcement process is not a rehearing of the case; it is entirely out of the arbitral 
process. The only connection is that the actual decision was reached by arbitrators, not 
judges, and that reason for not enforcing an award is only found in “arbitration law.” 
Accordingly, judicialization is not a feature in this process which in effect is only needed 
if parties to an arbitration have not honoured the award. 
III  CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that judicialization is not an issue; rather, it is a 
misconception. Since “arbitration is a consensual process crafted by the parties, 
generally through their attorneys, they are in the driver’s seat when it comes to the 
process that they get.”34 However, in focusing on the need for increasingly cheap and 
efficient arbitral awards, commentators and arbitration practitioners risk the danger of 
searching for the ‘El Dorado’ of arbitration. In this instance, every arbitral award is 
quick, efficient, and streamlined. Trakman et all argued correctly: 
Rather than support overbroad and general contentions that [International 
Commercial Arbitration] ICA is inherently flawed for being ‘judicialized’ or 
arguing that ICA arbitrators consistently fail to focus sufficiently clearly on 
material issues, commentators and practitioners alike need to realize that the 
quality of an ICA award relies on many factors.35
This paper has demonstrated that such qualities are desirable only in some cases. 
Such qualities should not portray simplicity in arbitral decision-making as an end in 
itself, in disregard of the potentially diminished quality of those decisions.36 It appears 
that it is not the arbitral ‘system’ that gives rise to excessive formalism but, rather, the 
participants in the process; namely, clients, arbitrators and lawyers.  In the end, it is 
the arbitrator who must “take charge and not live in fear of an appeal to overrule their 
award.”37 What is needed is a critical and contextual analysis of the normative attributes 
of arbitration globally, beyond the narrow critique of undue legal formalism.38 
33  Zeller and Andersen (n 6) 211.
34  Phillips (n 10) [38].
35  Trakman (n 9) 432.
36  Ibid [406].
37  Philips, (n 9) [42]. 
38  Trakman (n 9) [407].
